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2024年03月07日 [世界史の理解]
タカスギ世界史研究所へようこそ/welcome to Takasugi Institute (20)
(13)でも紹介させていただきましたが、1941年12月の独米関係の順番はご理解いただけたでしょうか？日米交渉にあたっていた野村吉三郎駐米大使の回想録を見ると、『ドイツ軍の進撃の陰り』という表現が出てきますが、おそらくスモレンスク占領後のことを指しているのであろうと思われます。10月初めまで東への進撃がなかったことからそう判断されたと思われますが、南への進撃という点では進撃の速度は鈍っていないのです。この判断は不適切ですが、同じ回想録での日米交渉の行き詰まりにおいて、『（ドイツ軍の進撃の状況を）あと少し見守り』との記述がありますがこれは極めて適切でした。ドイツ軍がモスクワを占領できない前提があれば日本の真珠湾攻撃はあったか極めて疑問です。『ドイツ陸軍の敗北があれば』は駐日米国大使も述べています。日本がアメリカとの戦争を最終的に決定したのは、16時間に及ぶ11月1日の大本営政府連絡会議でしたが、10月のドイツ軍のモスクワ進撃は順調でこのことが決定に影響を与えていたとすると日本にとっては非常に不運であったと言えるでしょう。アメリカでは、日本はドイツの圧力で決定を行なっていると見られていましたが、『圧力』ではなく『勝利を前提に』決定されていたわけです。独ソ戦の開戦日を正確に予言した『ドイツ駐在ドイツ』大使の大島浩の情報を信じすぎたことも日本には不利でした。真珠湾攻撃の立案者の山本五十六提督ですらまさかドイツ軍がモスクワを占領できないとは想定外のことであったわけです。独ソ戦が、陸軍とヒトラーの間で最初から目標が食い違っていたことを日本がどれだけ知っていたかがポイントでした。
13) I also introduced it, but did you understand the order of Germany-U.S. relations in December 1941? If you look at the memoirs of the ambassador to the United States, Yoshisaburo Nomura, who was negotiating between Japan and the United States, the expression "the shadow of the German army's advance" appears, but it probably refers to what happened after the occupation of Smolensk. It seems that it was judged so because there was no advance to the east until the beginning of October,operation “typhoon”, but the speed of the advance has not slowed down in terms of the advance to the south. This judgment is inappropriate, but in the deadlock of the Japan-U.S. negotiations in the same memoir, there is a description that "(watch the situation of the German army's advance) a little more", but this was extremely appropriate. If there is a premise that the German army can not occupy Moscow, it is extremely doubtful whether there was a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. " If the German army is defeated," the U.S. Ambassador to Japan also said. It was very unfortunate for Japan. It was a 16-hour headquarters government liaison meeting on November 1 that Japan finally decided to go to war with the United States, but it can be said that it was very unlucky for Japan if the German army's advance to Moscow in October was smooth and this was affecting the decision. In the United States, it was seen that Japan was making a decision under German pressure, but it was not "pressure" but "on the premise of victory". It was also disadvantageous to Japan that he believed too much in the information of Hiroshi Oshima, the ambassador of "Germany to Germany" who predicted strictly the start date of the German-Soviet war. It was unexpected that even Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor, could not expect that the German army could not occupy Moscow. The point was how much Japan knew that the goals of the German-Soviet War were different between the army and Hitler before the war ,resulting in the failure of Moscow occupation.
13) I also introduced it, but did you understand the order of Germany-U.S. relations in December 1941? If you look at the memoirs of the ambassador to the United States, Yoshisaburo Nomura, who was negotiating between Japan and the United States, the expression "the shadow of the German army's advance" appears, but it probably refers to what happened after the occupation of Smolensk. It seems that it was judged so because there was no advance to the east until the beginning of October,operation “typhoon”, but the speed of the advance has not slowed down in terms of the advance to the south. This judgment is inappropriate, but in the deadlock of the Japan-U.S. negotiations in the same memoir, there is a description that "(watch the situation of the German army's advance) a little more", but this was extremely appropriate. If there is a premise that the German army can not occupy Moscow, it is extremely doubtful whether there was a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. " If the German army is defeated," the U.S. Ambassador to Japan also said. It was very unfortunate for Japan. It was a 16-hour headquarters government liaison meeting on November 1 that Japan finally decided to go to war with the United States, but it can be said that it was very unlucky for Japan if the German army's advance to Moscow in October was smooth and this was affecting the decision. In the United States, it was seen that Japan was making a decision under German pressure, but it was not "pressure" but "on the premise of victory". It was also disadvantageous to Japan that he believed too much in the information of Hiroshi Oshima, the ambassador of "Germany to Germany" who predicted strictly the start date of the German-Soviet war. It was unexpected that even Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor, could not expect that the German army could not occupy Moscow. The point was how much Japan knew that the goals of the German-Soviet War were different between the army and Hitler before the war ,resulting in the failure of Moscow occupation.
